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Incentives to give up resource extraction
and avoid the tragedy of the commons
Abstract
This paper develops a general model of common resource extraction where we
introduce payments for environmental services to encourage resource users to give
up extraction. The goal is to reach a balance between resource use and conserva-
tion. As the essence of conservation is dynamic, we use a dynamic model to study
the implementation of the compensation scheme. A stable heterogeneous equi-
librium can be reached where both extractors and non-extractors live together.
We analyze how the success of the compensation depends on factors such as the
elasticity of demand and the biological characteristics of the resource.
Keywords: common resource, overcapacity, payment for environmental ser-
vices, compensation, replicator dynamics
JEL classification: Q20; Q29; C61
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1 Introduction
Natural resource conservation seeks the protection, maintenance or rehabilitation of
native biota, habitats and life-supporting systems to ensure ecosystem sustainability and
biodiversity (Olver et al., 1995). Although conservation often warrants the limitation
of use to ensure ecosystem sustainability, conservation should not be confused with
non-use (Clark, 2010). Natural resource conservation recognizes roles for both use and
preservation but adopts neither as its central premise (Olver et al., 1995). Human uses
must be reconciled with intrinsic and necessary ecosystem functions and structures.
Compensations for an agreed-upon inaction or for actively improving environmental
servicies are part of a new and more direct conservation paradigm, explicitly recognizing
the need to bridge the interests of landowners and outsiders (Wunder, 2007). Typically,
landowners want to exploit the resource while outsiders want to preserve the resource.
The idea is that outsiders or a central authority can compensate landowners and resource
users in return for adopting practices that secure ecosystem conservation and restoration.
Compensations for agreed-upon inaction or to change appropriation behavior have
been implemented in different countries. One of the most popular compensation schemes
is Payments for Environmental Services (PES). These are voluntary agreements involv-
ing environmental service providers who have real land use choices. These providers
receive payments from environmental service buyers if they secure the provision of an
environmental service such as carbon sequestration, biodiversity conservation, or land-
scape beauty (Wunder, 2005). These programs have been implemented in Costa Rica
(Pagiola, 2008), Ecuador (Wunder and Alba´n, 2008), France (Perrot-Maˆıtre, 2006) and
many other countries (see the special issue in Ecological Economics 2008). In other
countries such as the USA agreements to protect ecosystems are based on conservation
easements that pay landowners through tax exemptions (Katila and Puustja¨rvi, 2004).
Each of these schemes is different but the common pattern is that users receive (mon-
etary) compensation in exchange from some change in extraction practice. Providers
who can produce the requested ecosystem service at or below the offered price have an
incentive to enroll in the program whereas providers who have a higher opportunity cost
of enrolling do not (Jack et al., 2008).
PES schemes try to change the incentives related to resource use by offering a set
of payments for service provision. However some schemes have been more successful
than others (Wunder, Engel and Pagiola, 2008). Various factors have been found to
affect the effectiveness of a PES scheme to enhance natural resource conservation: what
to pay for, how much to pay, how to pay, whom to pay, among others (Wunder, 2005;
Wunder 2006; Engel et al., 2008; Jack et al., 2008). Concerning what to pay for,
compensations can be directed to change exploitation practices or to promote inaction
(Wunder, 2007), depending on the conservation goal and the land-use scenario. The
amount of compensation remains an open question, as it should be high enough to
motivate participants but not so high that it debilitates pre-existing social markets and
lowers the intrinsic motivation to preserve natural resources voluntarily (Wunder, 2005).
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Concerning who to pay, in order to be cost-effective one would want to compensate
those who have credible site-specific claims and can make decisions about resource use.
Problems arise when land ownership or rights of use are not well defined. As Wunder
(2005, 2006) points out, the more open the access, the less adequate the scenario is
for PES. Nevertheless, PES schemes are often focused on nonpoint sources or on many
individual landowners whose collective activities alter the levels of a given ecosystem
service (Jack et al., 2008).
In fact, PES programs can help to prevent the well-known tragedy of the commons:
the situation in which natural resources are used or exploited by a large number of
individuals, leading to over-exploitation and degradation (Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 1990).
In this paper we develop a general model to study how the introduction of monetary
compensations affects the use of common property resources focusing on compensations
for giving-up exploitation, that is, compensations for inaction. The main question is
whether the entire community of users accepts the compensation or, instead, achieves
a balance between use and preservation in which some users accept the compensation
and others continue with resource extraction.
As the essence of conservation is dynamic (Clark, 2010), we use a dynamic model
to study the implementation of the compensation scheme. The dynamics of the natural
resource play a key role as the resource stock level reached with a certain scheme will
determine the success of the program. We also focus our attention on the incentives
introduced by the compensation program and the decision of users concerning whether
to enroll in the program. These decisions are modeled using a replicator dynamics for
which users compare extraction profits with compensation for non-extraction. A deep
understanding of both dynamics (resource and users) can help to design compensation
schemes that lead to stable situations with sustainable stock levels. Resource and users
dynamics play a central role in other studies of resource exploitation such as Sethi and
Somanathan (1996), which analyzes the role of social norms and sanctions in preserving
natural resources under common property regimes; Brander and Taylor (1998), which
analyzes the exploitation of natural resources in Easter Island and the dynamics that led
to its collapse; and Ose´s-Eraso and Viladrich-Grau (2007), which analyzes how social
approval of cooperators works as a reward mechanism that fosters pervasive coopera-
tive behavior and the sustainable management of natural resources. In our paper, we
show that not all resource users accept the compensation and that a stable heteroge-
neous equilibrium can be reached were both extractors and non-extractors live together,
maintaining a greater resource stock level.
For the success of compensation scheme, that is, for the dynamics to reach a stable
heterogeneous equilibrium,two factors play a key role: the demand for the natural re-
source and its biological characteristics. In this paper we analyze both. With respect to
the first factor, we find that the elasticity of resource demand determines the basins of
attraction for the stable heterogeneous equilibrium. When resource demand is inelastic,
there are incentives to join the compensation scheme if the resource level is high; when
the resource demand is elastic, there are incentives to join if the resource level is low.
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This means that responses to a certain compensation scheme, including the tendency
of dynamics towards equilibrium, differ depending on resource demand. This is a new
approach that departs from previous studies of common resource exploitation that only
consider perfectly elastic demand (competitive markets). In recent decades, increased
product differentiation has led to oligopolistic competition policies for almost all goods,
and natural resources are no exception. Quality labels such as a green card, local ad-
vertising for the resources, and even some cultural preferences, have made it so that
many natural resources are difficult to replace in both consumption and production.
Accodingly, it is not entirely realistic to assume constant prices for these resources in
local markets, regional or even international markets. As finding substitutes for these
resources becomes increasingly difficult, resource prices can vary depending on various
factors such as demand, extraction or perhaps scarcity (see Stiglitz, 1979).
As for the seconf factor, we show that biological characteristics of the natural resource
(such as the potential natural growth rate, carrying capacity or biotic potential) also
condition the success of the compensation programs. We find that slower-growing species
need higher compensations in order to reach the same conservation status. Similarly, we
determine that species with greater carrying capacity and species with higher potential
biota need lower compensations to reach the same conservation status.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the exploitation of
common resources. The Section 3 introduces incentives to give up exploitation and
replicator dynamics. Sections 4 and 5 analyze the dynamic model and Section 6 de-
scribes the equilibria. Finally, Section 7 develops some policy implications and Section
8 concludes.
2 Exploitation of natural resources
In order to investigate the economics of a renewable resource, it is first necessary to
describe its pattern of biological growth. Any population of a renewable resource exists
in a particular environmental setting with a finite carrying capacity that sets bounds
on population growth possibilities. Additionally, for very small population sizes, the
chance that the species will become extinct is rather large since mating encounters are
low (Dasgupta and Heal, 1979). A simple way of representing these effects is to make
the actual growth rate depend on the stock size using what is called density-dependent
growth. A commonly used functional form that captures these features is a generalized
logistic function,
G(X) = r(X − T )
(
1− X
K
)
(1)
where X is the resource stock. The positive parameter r is the intrinsic or potential
growth rate of the resource. K represents the carrying capacity, that is, the maximum
amount of resource that can be supported by the environment and T is a positive stock
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threshold level such that the resource population would inevitably and permanently de-
cline to zero if the actual resource level were ever to fall below that threshold. Following
Taylor (2009) we refer to this threshold level as the tipping point.1 In addition, we
define XMSY (maximum sustainable yield) as the population level at which the growth
of the resource is maximized. Notice that T < XMSY < K.
2 A generalized logistic
growth function G(X) is represented in figure 1.
The rate of change of the resource stock depends on the prevailing stock size but
it also depends on harvesting. Many factors determine the size of the harvest H in
any given period. The most relevant of these are following. First, the harvest depends
on the means devoted to resource extraction. For the sake of simplicity, we aggregate
the different dimensions of harvesting activity into one magnitude called total effort E.
Second, the harvest also depends on the resource stock size X.3 The easiest way to
capture these factors is through the following linear harvest function,
H(E, X) = qEX (2)
where q is a parameter that represents the state of the harvest technology. If the
natural resource is exploited under a common property regime in which n individuals
have exploitation rights, the total effort level is the sum of the individual effort level,
ei, of each of the resource users, i = 1, ..., n, that is, E =
∑
n
i=1 ei. We refer to n as
the community of users and we assume, without loss of generality, that individual effort
ei ∈ {0, 1}. This means that agents can choose either to not exploit the resource, ei = 0,
or to exploit the resource, ei = 1. For those who exploit the resource, we treat them
as homogeneous with respect to effort; then for the sake of simplicity we can normalize
individual effort equal to one, ei = 1. Taking this into account, the total effort of a
community would be given by the number of individuals of that community who go to
harvest nh, i.e. E = nh.
4 Given G and H the following motion equation describes the
resource stock dynamics.
X˙ = G(X)−H(nh, X) = r(X − T )
(
1− X
K
)
− qnhX (3)
where X˙ = dX
dt
. The equilibrium will be achieved whenever X˙ = 0, that is, whenever the
growth rate equals the exploitation level. For the evaluation of exploitation strategies
1Dasgupta and Heal (1979) point out that for various land animals the biotic potential is low. For
such species T would be large. Unlike these, various species of fish have a high biotic potential. For
them T would be low and indeed for all practical purposes it may be convenient to regard T = 0 for
them. When T = 0 we get the simple logistic function (Perman et al., 2003; Taylor, 2009).
2For a generalized logistic growth function like (1), XMSY =
K+T
2
.
3For a more extensive explanation of the harvest’s determinants see Clark (1990), Dasgupta & Heal
(1979).
4Notice that if the individual effort is equal to one and if all individuals execute their right to exploit
the resource, the total effort exerted for resource extraction is driven by the number of individuals
entitled to exploit it, and thus the linear harvest function of equation 2 becomes to H(nh, X) = qnX .
Now if only a fraction of all potential users nh exploits the resource, then the total effort will be
determined by H(nh, X) = qnhX .
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and resource preservation, we are interested in the resource level that exist at the equi-
librium. Following Clark (2010), an exploitation strategy specifies the rate of removals
(harvest) over time, as well as the remaining stock over time. A strategy that retains a
higher future stock level than some other strategy would be considered to be the more
conservational of the two.
In figure 1, we have depicted the equilibrium stock levels, X̂, for three different
exploitation efforts, E = n1h, E = n
2
h and E = n
c
h such that n
1
h < n
c
h < n
2
h. Observe
that any total effort level above nc
h
, such as n2
h
in figure 1, leads to extinction as the
harvest H is above the resource growth G, for any resource stock level. Meanwhile, any
total effort below nc
h
, such as n1
h
in figure 1, describes two different equilibrium stock
levels, X̂1 and X̂2.
5 We refer to nc
h
as the critical extinction level and the corresponding
equilibrium stock level is X̂c.6 The equilibrium points X̂1 are asymptotically locally
stable while equilibrium points X̂2 are asymptotically locally unstable.
7
Figure 1: Preservation levels
Following Copeland and Taylor (2009), we define the users’ capacity to harvest as
Ω = n/nch. When Ω ≥ 1, there is overcapacity; that is, if all the users execute their right
5We can obtain mathematically the equilibrium stock levels, X̂ , that correspond to any exploitation
effort, nh < n
c
h, as X̂ =
K
2r
[
r
(
1 + T
K
)− qnh ±√(qnh − r (1 + TK ))2 − 4r2 TK ].
6The critical extinction level is nch =
r
q
(
1−
√
T
K
)2
. This critical level increases with r, the intrinsic
growth rate, showing that, other things being equal, fast growing species withstand higher exploitation
pressure. Conversely, improvements in harvest technology, q, reduce the critical exploitation level
supported by the resource.
7Let X̂ be an isolated equilibrium point of the resource stock dynamics described in (3). Following
Takayama (1994), this point is asymptotically locally stable (unstable) if ∂X˙
∂X
< 0 (∂X˙
∂X
> 0). That is,
X̂ is asymptotically locally stable (unstable) if ∂G
∂X
< ∂H
∂X
that is, when X̂ > X̂c ( ∂G
∂X
> ∂H
∂X
, that is,
when X̂ < X̂c).
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to harvest the resource, extinction will occur. When Ω < 1, extinction can be avoided
even if all users execute their rights.
3 Incentives to give up exploitation
The number of potential users who exploit the common resource depends on the extrac-
tion incentives. If an agent exploits the resource and executes an effort level ei = 1 she
gets, according to the harvest function (2), an individual harvest h = qX. Taking into
account the opportunity cost of effort, c, and the resource price, P (H), the extraction
payoff of agent i can be defined as follows,
pih = P (H)qX − c (4)
We assume that the resource price depends negatively on total harvest, dP
dH
< 0.
Whenever pih > 0, agents have incentives to exploit the common resource.
If pih > 0 for a wide range of resource levels X, a continuous exploitation of the
natural resource can threaten resource preservation and even resource survival. As
wilderness and natural habitats shrink, environmental services previously provided freely
by nature become increasingly threatened (Wunder, 2005). Nervertheless, there is a clear
lack of incentives to preserve natural resources and enhance environmental services, as
users typically receive no compensation for the services their resources generate for
others. That is, they have no economic reason to take these services into account in
making decisions about resource use (Pagiola and Platais, 2002).
Recognition of this problem has led to efforts to develop systems in which resource
users are paid for the environmental services they generate, thus aligning their incentives
with those of society as a whole (Pagiola and Platais, 2002, Jack et al.,2008). This
reasoning is the core idea of payment for environmental services (PES), which presents
a contractual and conditional payment to local resource holders and users in return for
adopting practices that secure ecosystem conservation and restoration (Wunder, 2005).8
The implementation of these programs modifies the incentives of resource users with
the purpose of achieving improvements in resource conservation. The success of these
programs depends on issues such as what type of actions or activities are compensated
(compensations should be oriented to incentivize activities that secure conservation),
how much is paid (compensations should be high enough to alter the incentives of
exploitation), and who receives payment (compensations should be received by those
that have rights of use and can decide about resource exploitation, that is, landowners)
(Wunder, 2005, Jack et al., 2008).
In the context of natural resource exploitation by a community of n users, we can
introduce a compensation w that can be received by any of the potential resource users.
8Payment for environmental services have been used in developing countries such as Costa Rica
(Chomitz et al.,1999; Pagiola 2008) and Ecuador (Wunder and Alban, 2008) but also in developed
countries such as France (Perrot-Maˆıtre, 2006).
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The condition to receive such a compensation is not to exploit the resource. That is,
a resource user that chooses ei = 0 receives a compensation w while a resource user
that chooses ei = 1 gets the corresponding extraction payoff, pih. Any resource user
can decide whether she wants to continue with resource extraction, ei = 1, or take the
compensation and give up resource extraction, ei = 0. Let sh be the proportion of
owners that decide to extract (or harvest) from the natural resource in a certain period
t. (1− sh) is the proportion of owners that do not extract and take the compensation
instead. The owners shift gradually towards the group (extractors or non-extractors)
whose payoff is above the average. The gradual change from one group to another
can be captured using the replicator dynamics. Recall that the general expression of
the replicator dynamics is s˙i = si(pii − pi) where s˙i = dsidt , the subscript i applies to
both extractors and non-extractors, and pi is the average payoff of resource owners,
pi = shpih + (1− sh)w. Therefore, the replicator dynamics reduces to a single equation:
s˙h = sh(1− sh)(pih − w) (5)
where s˙h =
dsh
dt
and pih is the individual extraction payoff and w is the compensation.
Resource owners change their exploitation decision, ei ∈ {0, 1}, depending on the pay-
offs: the greater the difference in payoffs, the greater is the probability of change. The
underlying idea is that not all individuals will make this decision at the same time;
some will exploit the resource because they believe future earnings will be positive (or
for some other reason), while others will not exploit it.
The expression of the replicator dynamics governs the incentives for potential re-
source users to exploit the natural resource or accept the monetary compensation for
non-extraction. Clearly, these incentives depend on the extraction payoffs, and these are
conditioned by the stock of the resource, among other factors. Therefore, the resource
stock dynamics influence the incentives for resource extraction.
In a similar way, the proportion of potential users that finally decide to exploit
the natural resource despite monetary compensations for non-extraction determine the
harvest level, and this harvest level affects the evolution of the resource stock. Therefore,
incentives for resource extraction influence resource stock dynamics.
Both variables, the proportion of resource extractors (sh) and the resource stock
level (X), constitute a socio-economic system represented by the following equations:
s˙h = sh(1− sh)(pih − w)
X˙ = r(X − T )
(
1− X
K
)
− qnshX (6)
Observe that the first equation of the system is the replicator dynamics in equation
5 and the second equation is the resource stock dynamics of equation 3 with nh = shn.
To analyze this dynamic system, we study each dynamic separetely and then consider
the entire system.
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4 Resource stock dynamics
The evolution of the resource stock depends on resource natural growth, G(X), and on
the harvest rate, H(sh, X), as stated in the second equation of the dynamic system (6).
According to this equation, the resource stock will be in equilibrium whenever X˙ = 0,
that is, whenever the extraction rate equals the natural growth. As the extraction rate
depends on the proportion of extractors, the resource stock level at equilibrium, X̂, is
a function of the proportion of extractors, sh. The following lemma summarizes this
relationship.
Lemma 4.1 For the resource stock dynamics, there exists a set of stable equilibrium
points, X̂1(sh), and a set of unstable equilibrium points, X̂2(sh). The former is a decrea-
sing function of sh while the latter is an increasing function of sh.
Proof.
Given s∗h ∈ [0, 1], let X̂∗(s∗h) be an isolated equilibrium point of the resource stock
dynamics (second equation in the system (6)). Following Takayama (1994; pp.336),
X̂∗(s∗h) is asymptotically locally stable (unstable) if
∂X˙
∂X
< 0 (∂X˙
∂X
> 0) evaluated at
X̂∗(s∗
h
). We calculate ∂X˙
∂X
,
∂X˙
∂X
=
dG
dX
− ∂H
∂X
= r
(
1− 2X
K
+
T
K
)
− qnsh
Applying the implicit function theorem to X˙ = 0, we get the following expression.
dX̂
dsh
=
qnX
r
(
1− 2X
K
+ T
K
)
− qnsh
(7)
First, the expression in the denominator is ∂X˙
∂X
. Second, the expression in the numer-
ator takes always a positive value. Therefore, dX̂
dsh
< 0 for any stable equilibrium point
X̂∗(s∗h) while
dX̂
dsh
> 0 for any unstable equilibrium point X̂∗(s∗h). We refer to the set of
stable points as X̂1(sh) and to the set of unstable points as X̂2(sh).
We have depicted both sets of equilibrium points in figure 2.9 This figure can be easily
compared with figure 1. The critical extinction level is represented now by sc
h
=
nc
h
n
.
Observe that sc
h
is the inverse of the users’ capacity to harvest, Ω; therefore, extinction
9The mathematical expressions for these set of equilibrium points are X̂1(sh) =
K
2r
[
r
(
1 + T
K
)− qnsh +√(qnsh − r (1 + TK ))2 − 4r2 TK ], for the stable ones, and X̂2(sh) =
K
2r
[
r
(
1 + T
K
)− qnsh −√(qnsh − r (1 + TK ))2 − 4r2 TK ] for the unstable ones. It is straightforward
that X̂1(0) = K, X̂2(0) = T and X̂1(s
c
h) = X̂2(s
c
h) =
√
KT .
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is a credible threat whenever sc
h
< 1 (Ω > 1). We can also analyze the dynamics towards
these equilibrium levels and we observe that for any level sh < s
c
h, whenever the resource
stock X is such that X > X̂1(sh), the resource stock decreases. Similarly, if X < X̂2(sh)
the resource stock also decreases. Inversely, whenever X̂1(sh) > X > X̂2(sh), the
resource stock increases. When sh > s
c
h
, the resource stock always decreases. These
dynamics are represented by the arrows in figure 2.
Figure 2: Resource stock dynamics and extinction
In order to understand the resource stock dynamics, assume that the proportion
of extractors, sh, is exogenously given and is not altered through time. Assume also
that the resource stock is exogenously given but evolves through time according to the
dynamics described above. We can distinguish the set of initial conditions, (s0
h
, X0) that
will end up in resource extinction (shaded area in figure 2) from those initial conditions
that will avoid resource extinction (unshaded area in figure 2). Observe that (i) whenever
the proportion of extractors is fixed and above the critical level, s0
h
> sc
h
, the resource
will become extinct regardless of the initial resource stock, and (ii) whenever s0
h
< sc
h
extinction is avoided only if X0 > X̂2(s
0
h).
The sets of equilibrium points of the resource stock dynamics depend on (i) the
biological characteristics of the resource (intrinsic growth rate, carrying capacity and
tipping point), (ii) the technology of extraction, and (iii) the size of the community of
users. Consider first the biological characteristics of the resource and, among those,
the intrinsic growth rate, r. Others things being equal, a greater intrinsic growth rate
shrinks the set of initial conditions that end up in extinction and therefore increases the
set of initial conditions that avoid extinction.10 In other words, species that grow faster
have greater possibility to avoid resource extinction. In figure 3(a) we have depicted
in black the equilibrium sets of figure 2 and, over this one, in gray are illustrated the
10Recall that we have already pointed out that the critical exploitation level, nch increases with r
and therefore sch =
nc
h
n
also increases with r. In addition, X̂c does not change as it can be easily
demonstrated that it does not depend on r, X̂c =
√
KT .
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equilibrium sets of a greater intrinsic grow rate, which, as we can see, decreases the area
of extinction compared with the one in figure 2. Other biological characteristics that
can affect the resource dynamics are the carrying capacity, K, and the tipping point, T .
The risk of resource extinction is greater in species with higher tipping point but it is
smaller in species with higher carrying capacity, as can be seen in figures 3(b) and 3(c).
Figure 3: Changes in resource stock dynamics
Consider now that the resource stock is extracted using a technology that has greater
productivity (greater q in our model). Improvements in harvest technology reduce the
critical exploitation level supported by the resource, sc
h
, and therefore increase the set
of initial conditions that end up in extinction. This can be seen in figure 3(d). More
productive technologies for resource extraction may increase the risk of extinction.
A similar result is obtained if we consider resource stocks exploited by larger commu-
nities (community size is represented by n). A larger community has the same critical
level expressed as number of users, nhc , but not when it is expressed as proportion of
users, sc
h
, which is smaller. Therefore, other things being equal, larger communities have
greater risk of resource extinction. This can also be seen in figure 3(d).
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5 Resource users’ dynamics
We now consider the decisions of potential resource users concerning whether to ex-
tract the resource or give up extraction in exchange for monetary compensation. The
incentives for these strategies are summarized in the replicator dynamics (first equation
of the dynamic system (6)). This dynamic will reach an equilibrium point whenever
s˙h = 0. Observe that, whenever sh = 0 or sh = 1, the users’ dynamic is in equilibrium,
regardless of the resource stock level. This set of equilibrium points can be considered
as trivial. An equilibrium point sh ∈ (0, 1) will be reached whenever w = pih, that is,
when the monetary compensation for non-extraction equals the extraction payoff. The
following lemma describes the interior equilibrium points of the users’ dynamics.
Lemma 5.1 For the resource users’ dynamics there exists a set of equilibrium points
X˜(sh) which are asymptotically locally stable whenever
dP
dH
< 0.
Proof. Given s∗
h
∈ (0, 1), let X˜∗(s∗
h
) be an isolated equilibrium point of equation 5.
Following Takayama (1994; pp.336), X˜∗(s∗h) is asymptotically locally stable (unstable)
if ∂s˙h
∂sh
< 0 (∂s˙h
∂sh
> 0) evaluated at X˜∗(s∗
h
). We calculate ∂s˙h
∂sh
,
∂s˙h
∂sh
= (1− 2sh)(p(H)qX − c− w) + dP
dH
q2X2nsh(1− sh)
Evaluating this expression in X˜∗(s∗
h
), we get
∂s˙h
∂sh
|
X˜∗(s∗
h
)
=
dP
dH
q2X2ns∗
h
(1− s∗
h
)
As s∗
h
∈ (0, 1), ∂s˙h
∂sh
|
X˜∗(s∗
h
)
< 0 whenever dP
dH
< 0 and then X˜∗(s∗
h
) is asymptotically
locally stable.
The condition dP
dH
< 0 means a negative relationship between resource prices and
resource extraction. This implies the usual negative slope for the demand function
of the natural resource. The shape of this set of equilibrium points depends on the
elasticity of demand as stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.2 Let P (H) be the inverse demand function,
a. If P (H) is elastic, then X˜(sh) is an increasing function of sh,
dX˜(sh)
dsh
> 0.
b. If P (H) is inelastic, then X˜(sh) is an decreasing function of sh,
dX˜(sh)
dsh
< 0.
c. If P (H) is perfectly elastic, then X˜(sh) is constant,
dX˜(sh)
dsh
= 0.
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Proof. Applying the implicit function theorem to the equilibrium condition to get
X˜(sh), p(H)qX − c− w = 0, we get
dX˜
dsh
= −
dP
dH
qnX2
P
(
1− 1
||
)
where || is the elasticity of the demand function defined as || =
∣∣∣dH
dP
P
H
∣∣∣. The expression
in the numerator is always negative as we have assumed dP
dH
< 0. The sign of the
expression in the denominators depends on the elasticity value. It is negative if || > 1
(elastic demand function), it is positive if || < 1 (inelastic demand function). Therefore,
dX˜
dsh
> 0 if || > 1 and dX˜
dsh
< 0 if || < 1 as stated in part (a) and part (b) of lemma 5.2
respectively.
Finally, it is straightforward that if dP
dH
= 0, that is, if || = ∞ (perfect elasticity of
the demand function), then dX˜
dsh
= 0, as stated in part (c) of lemma 5.2.
In figure 4 we have depicted the equilibrium points for (a) an elastic demand function,
(b) an inelastic demand function and (c) a perfectly elastic demand function. Equilib-
rium dynamics are represented by the arrows. The shaded area represents situations in
which individuals have incentives to accept the compensation. Interestingly, differences
in users’ behavior can be seen to depend on resource demand elasticity.
Figure 4: Resource users’ dynamics
Consider a situation where the resource stock is above the equilibrium level, X >
X˜(sh). As we can see in figure 4, the proportion of extractors increases (decreases) when
the resource demand is elastic (inelastic). The individual extraction payoff obtained is
greater (lower) than the compensation payment received by a non-extractor. Therefore,
some of the resource non-extractors (extractors) choose to exploit ( not exploit) the
resource, thus increasing (reducing) the proportion of extractors. This suggests that
14
low resource stocks are a greater incentive for resource extraction when the resource
demand is inelastic than when it is elastic.11
Likewise, consider the case in which the resource stock is below the equilibrium level,
X < X˜(sh). In this case, the proportion of extractors decreases (increases) when the
resource demand is elastic (inelastic). The individual extraction payoff obtained is lower
(greater) than the compensation payment received by a non-extractor. Therefore, some
of the resource extractors (non-extractors) choose to not exploit (exploit) the resource
thus decreasing (increasing) the proportion of extractors. Analogously, this suggests
that high resource stocks are a greater incentive to resource extraction when resource
demand is elastic than when it is inelastic.
Finally, it is worth mentioning the special case of perfectly elastic demand function
(competitive markets). Whenever the resource stock is below the unique equilibrium
level, the proportion of extractors will become zero. Alternatively, whenever the resource
stock is above the unique equilibrium level all the users will become extractors.
Apart from the elasticity of demand, the dynamics of resource users is also affected
by the quantity of individual compensation for non-extractors as well as by changes in
variables that determine individual extraction payoffs (opportunity cost of effort, har-
vest technology). An increase (decrease) in compensation for non-extraction increases
(decreases) the number of situations in which people give up exploitation for any elas-
ticity of demand. This change is reflected by a movement of the equilibrium set curve,
X˜. In the case of elastic demand (figure 5 (a)), X˜ moves to the northwest (southeast);
in the case of inelastic demand (figure 5 (b)), X˜ moves to the southwest (northeast);
for the particular case of perfect elastic demand (figure 5 (c)), X˜ moves up (down).12
Notice that any variation of the opportunity cost of effort, c, affects the equilibrium sets
in the same way as variations in the compensation quantity.
Of special interest is the effect of technology improvements on the resource users’
dynamics. Consider an improvement in extraction technology, represented in our model
as an increase in parameter q. If the demand for the resource is elastic (inelastic), the
improvement in technology increases (decreases) the number of situations in which the
resource users have incentives to exploit the resource. This can be seen as a rightward
(leftward) shift of the equilibrium set curve, X˜.13 (See figure 5 (d), (e) and (f)).
11These differences are due to the relationship between harvest payoff and resource stock that depends
on the resource demand elasticity. ∂pih
∂X
= qP
(
1− 1||
)
, where || is the absolute value of the resource
demand elasticity. ∂pih
∂X
< 0 if || < 1 (inelastic) and ∂pih
∂X
> 0 if || > 1 (elastic).
12These movements are explained using the already known relationship between harvest payoff and
the two variables, resource stock and proportion of extractors.
13Notice that these differences between elastic and inelastic demand functions are due to the rela-
tionship between harvest payoff and technology: ∂pih
∂q
= XP
(
1− 1||
)
, ∂pih
∂q
< 0 if || < 1 and ∂pih
∂q
> 0
if || > 1.
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Figure 5: Changes in the owners’ dynamics
6 Complete dynamics and equilibrium points
In the two previous sections we analyzed the resource stock dynamics and the resource
users’ dynamics on their own. However, these dynamics constitute a unique dynamic
system (see equation 6) and must also be considered together. For the system to be
in equilibrium we need both variables to be in equilibrium, that is, s˙h = 0 and X˙ = 0
simultaneously. Taking into account the analyses of the previous sections, there exist
six different possibilities for this to occur, as summarized in table 1.
Combining the resource dynamics and the users’ dynamics, we obtain figure 6. We
have depicted two different cases, one in which there is overcapacity (Ω > 1) and a
critical exploitation level; and a second in which there is no overcapacity (Ω < 1). The
letters that identify equilibria in the table correspond to the equilibria in figure 6.
In what follows, we analyze whether these equilibrium points are stable and what
factors determine the resource stock level that persists in these equilibria. We start with
the stability of equilibrium point A in table 1.
Theorem 6.1 (Equilibrium point A) An equilibrium point of the system (s∗
h
, X∗) such
that X∗ = X̂1(s
∗
h) = X˜(s
∗
h) is asymptotically locally stable,
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Equilibrium Resource Stock Users’ Dynamics
Type Equilibrium Equilibrium
A X̂1(sh) X˜(sh)
B X̂1(sh) sh = 0
C X̂1(sh) sh = 1
D X̂2(sh) X˜(sh)
E X̂2(sh) sh = 0
F X̂2(sh) sh = 1
Table 1: Equilibrium points of the socio-economic system
(a) when there exists a perfectly elastic demand for the extracted resource,
(b) when there exists an elastic demand for the extracted resource,
(c) when there exists an inelastic demand for the extracted resource and
∣∣∣∣dX̂1dsh
∣∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣∣ dX˜dsh
∣∣∣∣.
Proof. We calculate the Jacobian matrix of the dynamic system (equations 6)
J =
 r (1− 2XK + TK)− qnsh −qnX
sh(1− sh)qP
(
1− 1
||
)
(1− 2sh)(pqX − c− w) + dPdH q2X2n(1− sh)sh

We evaluate this Jacobian matrix at the equilibrium point of the system (s∗
h
, X∗)
such that X∗ = X̂1(s
∗
h) = X˜(s
∗
h),
J (s∗h, X
∗) =
(
J11 J12
J21 J22
)
=
 r (1− 2X∗K + TK)− qns∗h −qnX∗
s∗
h
(1− s∗
h
)qP
(
1− 1
||
)
dP
dH
q2X∗2n(1− s∗
h
)s∗
h
(8)
A sufficient condition for the stability of the equilibrium point is that the Jacobian
matrix evaluated at that point has a negative trace and a positive determinant.
We calculate the trace:
Tr = J11 + J22 = r
(
1− 2X
∗
K
+
T
K
)
− qns∗
h
+
dP
dH
q2X∗2n(1− s∗
h
)s∗
h
The trace condition is Tr < 0. As we have assumed X∗ = X˜1, by lemma 4.1
J11 < 0. As we have also assumed from the very beginning
dP
dH
< 0, we get J22 < 0.
Therefore, the trace condition is fulfilled for any equilibrium point (s∗
h
, X∗) such that
X∗ = X̂1(s
∗
h) = X˜(s
∗
h).
The trace condition is also fulfilled when dP
dH
= 0 as Tr = J11 < 0 (observe that
J22 = 0 in such case).
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Figure 6: Complete dynamics and equilibrium points
We calculate the determinant:
Dt = J11J22 − J12J21 =
[
r
(
1− 2X
K
+ T
K
)
− qns∗
h
] [
dP
dH
q2X∗2n(1− s∗
h
)s∗
h
]
+
+s∗
h
(1− s∗
h
)q2nX∗P
(
1− 1
||
)
Observe that J11J22 > 0. Additionally, we get J12J21 < 0 whenever || > 1 (elastic
demand), including the case where || = ∞ (perfectly elastic demand, competitive
markets). In these cases, the determinant is positive and the determinant condition is
also fulfilled.
That is, whenever the demand function for the resource is elastic, the equilibrium
point is asymptotically locally stable as stated in parts (a) and (b) of the theorem.
When the demand function for the resource is inelastic, however, J12J21 > 0 and to
get the sign of the determinant we need some more calculations. Applying some algebra
to the expression of the determinant we get the following:
Dt = q3n2X∗3
dP
dH
(1− s∗
h
)s∗
h
r
(
1− 2X∗
K
+ T
K
)
− qns∗h
qns∗
h
−
P
(
1− 1
||
)
dP
dH
qnX∗2

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According to the proofs of lemma 4.1 and 5.2, we can rewrite this expression,
Dt = q3n2X∗3
dP
dH
(1− s∗
h
)s∗
h
 1
dX̂1
dsh
− 1
dX˜
dsh
 (9)
The sign of the determinant depends on the slopes of X̂1 and X˜. If the demand of
extracted resource is inelastic, both functions have negative slopes (see lemma 4.1 and
lemma 5.2). Therefore, the determinant will be positive whenever 1
dX̂1
dsh
− 1
dX˜
dsh
 < 0
Using absolute values, 1∣∣∣∣ dX˜dsh
∣∣∣∣ −
1∣∣∣∣dX̂1dsh
∣∣∣∣
 < 0
An expression that is equivalent to the following one,∣∣∣∣∣dX̂1dsh
∣∣∣∣∣ <
∣∣∣∣∣dX˜dsh
∣∣∣∣∣
Now that theorem 6.1 has addressed the issues of stability, the following corollary
defines the conditions for uniqueness.
Corollary 6.1
i) If resource demand is elastic and there exists equilibrium A it is unique.
ii) If resource demand is inelastic and there exists equilibrium A uniqueness is not
guaranteed.
Theorem 6.1 and corollary 6.1 establish the conditions for the stability and unique-
ness of an equilibrium point such as A, showing that there are clear differences between
resources with elastic demand and resources with inelastic demand. However, they say
nothing about the existence of such equilibrium.
Consider a resource with elastic demand. Theorem 6.1 guarantees stability and
corollary 6.1 guarantees uniqueness. However, the existence of such equilibrium depends
on the quantity of compensation. This can be easily shown with a look at the phase
diagram in figure 6(a). We have already shown that X˜ moves upwards with higher
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compensations w.14 In order for an equilibrium A to exist we need a compensation
that guarantees intersection between X˜ and X̂, that is, a compensation greater than
pih(s
c
h
, Xc). Notice that similar conclusions can be obtained when the resource has
perfectly elastic demand.
On the other hand, stability and uniqueness are not guaranteed in the case of inelastic
demand. Since X̂1 and X˜ are decreasing functions on sh they can have one or two
intersections. Therefore, equilibrium A could be non-unique. In addition, the stability
of the intersection points depends on the slopes of X̂1 and X˜ as stated in theorem 6.1. As
we have already pointed out in the previous paragraph, the quantity of compensation
determines the existence of equilibrium points A. Assume there are two intersection
points as shown in figure 7(a). Notice that one of them is stable, AS, and the other one
is unstable, AU . If we decrease the quantity of compensation, we can reach a situation
like the one represented in figure 7(b) with a unique equilibrium point A. The stability of
this point AT is not guaranteed.
15 Observe that for a compensation below the tangent,
there is no intersection, that is, no equilibrium point A.16
Figure 7: Equilibrium point A and inelastic demand
Now we consider equilibrium point B, that is, an equilibrium where nobody extracts
the resource. In addition, and according to the description of the equilibrium points in
table 1, the resource stock is in the set of stable equilibrium points, X̂1(sh), and it is
easy to calculate that X̂1(0) = K.
17 Therefore, equilibrium point B is (sh, X) = (0, K).
Theorem 6.2 (Equilibrium point B) An equilibrium point (0, K) is asymptotically lo-
cally stable whenever w > pih(K).
14See movements of X˜ in section 5 and figure 5.
15Note that because AT is a tangency point between X̂1 and X˜, the slopes are equal. Observe in the
phase diagram that there exists an area that asymptotically leads us to this point while other areas do
not.
16Very high compensations can also lead to no intersection but in such cases, equilibrium point B
takes the leading role (see theorem 6.2).
17Taking sh = 0 in the mathematical expression of X̂1(sh) in (9) we get X̂1(0) = K.
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Proof. We evaluate this Jacobian matrix of the dynamic system (equations 6) at
the equilibrium point (0, K).(
r
(
T
K
− 1
)
−qnK
0 pqK − c− w
)
Following Takayama (1994) (Theorem 6.6, pp.341) point (0, K) is asymptotically
stable if the Jacobian matrix evaluated at that point has a negative trace and a positive
determinant.
We calculate the trace and the determinant.
Tr = J11 + J22 = r
(
T
K
− 1
)
+ pqK − c− w
Dt = J11J22 − J12J21 =
(
r
(
T
K
− 1
))
(pqK − c− w)
Note that J11 < 0 because
T
K
< 1. The conditions for local stability will be fulfilled
if and only if J22 < 0, that is, if pqK − c < w. Therefore, as (pqK − c) is the extraction
payoff evaluated in K, we can write it as pih(K) < w.
This theorem states that very high compensation can lead to non-exploitation while
the resource stock reachs carrying capacity K. The extraction payoff pih(0, K) denotes
the minimum compensation that makes this equilibrium stable.
Recall that there is also an equilibrium point of the system where all the users
choose resource exploitation, equilibrium point C in table 1.18 The following theorem
establishes the stability conditions of this equilibrium point.
Theorem 6.3 (Equilibrium point C) An equilibrium point (1, X̂1(1)) is asymptotically
locally stable whenever w < pih(1, X̂1(1)).
Proof. We evaluate this Jacobian matrix of the dynamic system (equations 6) at
the equilibrium point (1, X̂1(1)). r
(
1− 2X̂1
K
+ T
K
)
− qn −qnX̂1
0 −
(
pqX̂1 − c− w
)

Following Takayama (1994) (Theorem 6.6, pp.341) point (1, X̂1(1)) is asymptotically
stable if the Jacobian matrix evaluated at that point has a negative trace and a positive
determinant.
We calculate the trace and the determinant.
Tr = J11 + J22 = r
(
T
K
− 1
)
+ pqK − c− w
18Observe that C is an equilibrium point of the system if and only if Ω < 1 (see figure 6).
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Dt = J11J22 − J12J21 =
(
r
(
T
K
− 1
))
(pqK − c− w)
By lemma 4.1, we know that J11 < 0. The conditions for local stability will be
fulfilled if and only if J22 < 0, that is, if pqX̂1 − c > w. Therefore, as (pqX̂1 − c) is the
extraction payoff evaluated at point C, we can write it as pih(X̂1(1)) > w.
This theorem highlights the fact that compensations below pih(1, X̂1) lead to the same
result that is reached without compensations, making total extraction stable. It is worth
noting that this stability condition is incompatible with the existence of equilibrium
point A when resource demand is elastic. On the other hand, when resource demand is
inelastic, this stability condition does not preclude the existence of point A.
Theorem 6.4 (Equilibrium point D) An equilibrium point of the system (s∗h, X
∗) such
that X∗ = X̂2(s
∗
h
) = X˜(s∗
h
) is asymptotically locally stable when there exists an elastic
demand for the extracted resource, 1
dX̂2
dsh
<| dP
dH
| qX(1− sh)sh and dX̂2dsh > dX˜dsh .
Proof. Equilibrium point D - We evaluate the Jacobian matrix of the dynamic
system (equation 6) at the equilibrium point (s∗h, X
∗) such that X∗ = X̂2 (s
∗
h) = X˜ (s
∗
h).
This matrix is equivalent to matrix (8). In this case, J11 > 0 by lemma 4.1 and J22 < 0
as dP
dH
< 0. Therefore, we can not determinate the sign of the trace. Observe that
J22 = 0 when the resource demand is perfectly elastic (
dP
dH
= 0), in which case the
trace is positive, Tr = J11 > 0, implying that equilibrium point D is not asymptotically
locally stable.
In order to determine the sign of the determinant we have J12 < 0 and the sign of J21
depends on the resource demand elasticity. For an inelastic resource demand, J21 > 0
and the determinant, Dt = J11J22−J12J21 < 0 and therefore equilibrium point D is not
asymptotically locally stable. For an elastic resource demand, J21 < 0 and the sign of
the determinant depends on the slopes of X˜(sh) and X̂2(sh) as can be seen in equation
9. The determinant will be positive whenever dX̂2
dsh
> dX˜
dsh
. For stability, we also need a
negative trace, which is fulfilled when 1
dX̂2
dsh
<| dP
dH
| qX(1− sh)sh.
Theorem 6.4 allows for the possibility of reaching a stable point of the system even
when the resource dynamics is within an unstable region. However, this can only be
the case when the demand for the resource is elastic and there is a certain relationship
between the relevant slopes. Other equilibria in the unstable region of the resource
dynamics are not stable as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 6.5 (Equilibrium points E, F) Homogeneous equilibria (sh = 0, sh = 1) on
X̂2 are not asymptotically locally stable.
Proof. Equilibrium point E - We evaluate the Jacobian matrix of the dynamic
system (equation 6) at the equilibrium point (0, T ).(
r
(
1− T
K
)
−qnT
0 pqT − c− w
)
22
Note that J11 = r
(
1− T
K
)
> 0. Therefore, in order to have a negative trace we need
that J22 < 0. In such case, the determinant will be negative. Therefore, the stability
conditions will never be fulfilled.
Equilibrium point F - We evaluate the Jacobian matrix of the dynamic system (equa-
tions 6) at the equilibrium point (1, X̂2(1)). r
(
1− 2X̂2(1)
K
+ T
K
)
− qn −qnX̂2(1)
0 −
(
pqX̂2(1)− c− w
)

Note that J11 = r
(
1− 2X̂2(1)
K
+ T
K
)
− qn > 0 by lemma 4.1. Therefore, in order
to have a negative trace we need that J22 < 0. In such case, the determinant will be
negative. Therefore, the stability conditions will never be fulfilled.
Because the goal of a compensation scheme is to mitigate exploitation, some of the
potential compensation scheme equilibria are undesirable. This is the case with points
C, E and F. The stability analysis rules out the points E and F as they are unstable.
While point C can be stable, it should be avoided because it is the point that is achieved
without any compensation scheme (in a situation without overcapacity).
Furthermore, the goal of the compesation system is conservation offset, that is, the
goal is not to end resource use but to make use and preservation compatible. This
approach rules out equilibrium B, as this equilibrium implies that the resource is not
exploited and reaches the so-called natural equilibrium (carrying capacity).
Finally, an ambitious compensation system seeks not only to improve the actual
resource situation but to avoid biological overexploitation, that is, to reach a resource
stock level above that required for maximum sustainable yield (MSY ). This approach
discards point D because it always leads to a resource level below MSY as it is located
on X̂2.
Therefore, the quest for better conservation involving no biological overexploitation
leads us to look for a stable equilibrium A.
7 Policy implications
The objective of the schemes that we have considered is resource conservation. Following
Clark (2010) we assume that a scheme that retains a higher future stock level than some
other scheme would be consider the more conservationist of the two. The following
policy implications relate compensation quantities and future stock levels with different
biological and economic factors.
Implication 7.1 When resource demand is not perfectly elastic, slower-growing species
require higher compensations in order to obtain the same resource stock level
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Natural resources have different natural growth rates, a fact captured by the intrinsic
growth rate, r; the greater the intrinsic growth rate, the faster the natural growth of the
resource. We have already pointed out that the intrinsic growth rate alters the dynamics
of the natural resource; therefore it can also affect the results of the compensation
scheme. A lower resource stock is achieved at equilibrium point A when intrinsic growth
of the natural resource is slower (A0 vs. A1 in figure 8)
19. Therefore, in order to achieve
the same resource stock at equilibrium, we need higher compensations (A0 vs. A2 in in
figure 8), when intrinsic growth is slower.
As a conclusion, we can state that, other things being equal, slower-growing species
require higher compensations in order to obtain the same resource stock level or, con-
versely, fater-growing species need lower compensations in order to obtain the same
resource stock level. An exception is when the resource market is perfectly competi-
tive: in this case, faster-growing species need the same compensation as slower-growing
species to achieve the same resource stock level (see figure 8(c)).
Figure 8: Implication 1
Implication 7.2 When resource demand is not perfectly elastic, species with lower tip-
ping points need lower compensations in order to obtain the same resource stock level.
The biotic potential of a species determines what we call the tipping point. The
greater the biotic potential, the smaller the tipping point. Following a similar analysis
to the one presented above for the intrinsic growth rate, we can see that different tipping
19Observe that in each case, A0 and A1 are achieved with the same compensation w but reflect
different intrinsic growth rates, different stock levels and different total compensations, W = n(1−sh)w.
When the resource demand is elastic, r(A1) < r(A0) implies X̂1(A1) < X̂1(A0) and W (A1) > W (A0).
When the resource demand is inelastic, r(A1) < r(A0) implies X̂1(A1) < X̂1(A0) but W (A1) < W (A0).
That is, for a given compensation w, in both cases slower-growing species obtain lower resource stocks
at equilibrium but the total compensation increases with elastic demand and decreases with inelastic
demand.
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points affect the dynamics of the natural resource (see figure 3(b)) but not the users’
dynamics. In fact it is easy to see that, for the same compensation, a lower tipping point
implies greater resource stock at equilibrium level A. Therefore, in order to obtain the
same equilibrium stock level the compensation quantities also depend on the tipping
point. Species with lower tipping points require lower compensations to achieve the
same conservation goal.
Implication 7.3 When resource demand is not perfectly elastic, species with greater
carrying capacity need lower compensations in order to obtain the same resource stock
level.
Natural species can also differ in their carrying capacity. For those species with
greater carrying capacity there is a greater range of resource levels and, as a result,
a compensation scheme can reach higher resource stock levels. This implies greater
opportunities of conservation as well as lower compensations for the same resource level.
The above three implications are related to the biological parameters of the model.
The following two are related to two economic parameters of the model: the extracting
technology and the opportunity cost.
Implication 7.4 When resource demand is competitive or elastic, improvements in
harvesting technology should be followed by an increase in the compensation in order to
obtain the same resource stock level. When resource markets are inelastic, this increase
may not be necessary.
According to the resource stock dynamics, improvements in harvesting technology
mean greater extraction and, as result, the resource stock equilibrium decreases. How-
ever, according to the users’ dynamics, when resource demand is elastic this effect is
reinforced by a greater proportion of extractors (extraction profit increases with an im-
provement in harvesting technology), whereas,when resource demand is inelastic it can
be offset by a lower proportion of extractors (extraction profit decreases with an improve-
ment in harvesting technology). Therefore, in order to obtain the same resource stock
level, greater compensations are needed when resource demand is elastic, a conclusion
that can not be applied to a resource with inelastic demand.
Implication 7.5 An increase in the opportunity cost of effort should be followed by a
decrease in the compensation in order to obtain the same resource stock level
The opportunity cost of effort directly affects the incentives for resource extraction
through extraction profits. When greater opportunity cost reduces extraction payoff,
compensations become more attractive and resource stock increases. Therefore, the
same stock level can be obtained by lower compensation when opportunity costs are
greater.
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Implication 7.6 Larger communities require higher compensation to achieve the same
resource stock level.
Community size has no effect on the individual extraction payoffs but, as we have
already pointed out, it affects the proportion of extractors that sustain any equilibrium
resource stock: the larger the community the smaller the proportion. Therefore in order
to obtain the same resource stock level we need a lower proportion of extractors so we
need greater individual compensations.
8 Conclusions and future research
In this work we have shown that compensation for non-extraction can be sufficient
to reach stable equilibria that improve the situation of the commons. Applying this
program of compensation, the scheme would introduce incentives for some users to give
up exploitation while others would continue with resource extraction. The equilibrium
shows that it is not necessary to stop resource extraction completely to achieve resource
survival. Likewise, it is possible to reach any resource stock as long as the necessary
compensation is implemented.
To determine the necessary compensation, we must take the biological characteris-
tics of the resource into account. The results show that slower-growing species need
higher compensations in order to reach the same conservation status. Similarly, species
with greater carrying capacity and species with lower potential biota need lower com-
pensations to reach the same conservation status. Other factors such as improvements
in harvesting technology or changes in the opportunity costs of effort can also condition
the success of a compensation scheme.
In addition, it is important to consider the characteristics of the demand function.
The elasticity of demand drives the dynamics towards equilibrium and, as a result, the
trajectory of resource exploitation can be completely different: when resource demand
is inelastic, there are incentives to join the compensation scheme (less exploitation) if
the resource level is high but, when the resource demand is elastic, there are incentives
to join the compensation scheme if the resource level is low.
In any case, it is important to realize that the compensation scheme can be intro-
duced when the resource stock is far from overexploitation, as well as when the resource
stock is biologicaly overexploited. However, the open question that arises here is how
far-sighted a compensation initiative should be. From an economic or financial point of
view the objective is to minimize the social cost of the compensation scheme over time.
As this goal can be pursued by different paths, the question is which of these is the path
with the lowest cost.
At this point it is also important to realize that we have centered the analysis on
the supply part of the PES scheme, that is, the environmental services providers that
receive the compensations for changing the resource management behavior. But as
PES programs are voluntary agreements between environmental service providers and
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environmental service buyers, another important open question is, Who pays the com-
pensations?20
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